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COMMENTS
CHANGING INTERPRETATION OF NLRA
SECTION 8 (b) (1) (B) -UNION DISCIPLINE
OF SUPERVISORS IN THE AFTERMATH
OF FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT
INTRODUCTION

It is the policy of the United States to promote peace and
stability between labor unions and employers in order to prevent
the obstruction of commerce.' The means used to implement
this policy is the National Labor Relations Act.2 The Act
places emphasis upon the rights of employees to organize, form,
join or assist labor organizations, and also provides remedies in
those instances where employers have encroached upon employee rights.3 Moreover, through section 8(b) (1) (B), the Act
protects an employer's collective bargaining rights against union
interference by allowing the employer a free and unrestricted
4
choice of his collective bargaining representatives.
In protecting an employer's collective bargaining rights the
most common situation to which 8(b) (1) (B) is applied is the
"struck work" context. A struck work situation can arise when
an employer and the union representative of his employees have
reached an impasse in negotiations and the union engages in an
economic or unfair labor practice strike against the employer.
The employer requests or demands that his supervisors perform
the rank-and-file work normally done by the striking employees,
and the supervisors, who are also members of the union, are
fined by their union for strikebreaking. The employer then files
an 8(b) (1) (B) complaint with the National Labor Relations
Board5 claiming that imposition of the union fine has effectively
1. This policy has been eloquently stated in the National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter referred to as the Act] 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970):
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate
the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of

commerce .

.

. by encouraging the practice and procedure of collec-

tive bargaining..
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a) (1970).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (B) (1970) [hereinafter referred to as
8(b) (1) (B) ] states:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents(1) to restrain or coerce . . . (B) an employer in the selection of his
representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances. . ..
5. Hereinafter referred to as the Board.
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restrained him in the selection of his representatives for purposes
of collective bargaining or grievance adjustment. 6
Contract interpretation is another context in which an emloyer might claim that a union has committed an 8(b) (1) (B)
violation. In such a situation a supervisor is fined by his union
for his interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement in a
manner which the union considers harmful to its own interests.
Therefore, the employer brings 8(b) (1) (B) charges against the
union on the ground that the employer has been denied the right
to have his collective bargaining representative protect the employer's interests in an unrestrained manner.
These two common situations, struck work and contract
interpretation, accurately exemplify the predicament of the supervisor-union member. On the one hand, the employee is
expected to be loyal to the employer's interests. At the same
time, however, the union expects the supervisor to support an
employee strike or to resolve collective bargaining disputes in the
union's favor. The supervisor may become acutely aware of
these conflicting interests when he attempts to secure a promotion or some other type of employer benefit by demonstrating his
loyalty to management, while at the same time attempting to
retain union benefits that he may have accrued over the years
(originating, perhaps, when he was a non-supervisory employee). Although these underlying factors have undoubtedly had
some influence in 8(b) (1) (B) cases, the actual disposition of
such cases must be consistent with the provisions of the Act. In
order to determine whether there has in fact been an
8(b) (1) (B) violation, therefore, a careful evaluation of the
precise language of 8 (b) (1) (B), as well as a close analysis of
Board and judicial interpretation of the applicable statutory
provisions, is necessary. This comment will then examine recent changes which have been made in 8(b) (1) (B) interpretation by the Board and the courts in an attempt to cope with the
problems created in this area. A further consideration will be
whether deferral to fair and regular arbitration proceedings can
6. See also N'LRB v. Local 2150, IBEW, 486 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973);
Carpenters, Local 492, 211 N.L.R.B. 62 (1974); Bricklayers, Local 1, 209
N.L.R.B. 820 (1974); Operating Eng'rs, Local 450, 209 N.L.R.B. 463
(1974); Patternmakers Ass'n, 203 N.L.R.B. 1126 (1973); Comment, Union
Discipline of Supervisor Members, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 706 (1974).
7. A good example of an 8(b) (1) (B) violation in a contract interpretation setting is Bricklayers, Local 7, 193 N.L.R.B. 515 (1971) where
a supervisor was fined by his union for refusal to submit the firing of
a union steward to arbitration. The Board found an 8(b) (1) (B) violation on the grounds that the supervisor was engaged in contract interpretation in his refusal to arbitrate. See also McCraw v. United Ass'n, 341
F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965); Local 702, IBEW, 219 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 89
L.R.R.M. 1718 (1975); Providence Stereotypers', Union 53, 202 N.L.R.B.
195 (1973).
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provide a less cumbersome and more equitable means of resolving employer-union conflict.
THE CHANGING INTERPRETATION OF SECTION

8 (b) (1) (B)

One of the major problems inherent in 8(b) (1) (B) is the
very nature of the conflict that it was designed to resolve. Any
application of 8(b) (1) (B) must attempt to balance the vastly
different interests at stake between the employer and the union.
The legislative history of section 8(b) (1) (B) indicates that this
balance was intended to be struck by preventing unions and
their agents from "interfering with, restraining, or coercing employers in the selection of their representatives for the purposes
of collective bargainingor the settlement of grievances."s
Early case law interpreting section 8(b)(1)(B) demonstrated an intent to construe the section narrowly.9 A union was
held to have violated section 8(b) (1) (B) only in those situations in which there was restraint or coercion of those who were
shown to be collective bargainingor grievance adjustment representatives, thereby preventing substitution of the employer's personnel by the union." Thus, a violation existed when the union
refused to deal with the employer's representative, or struck in
order to obtain the representative's discharge, but not when the
union imposed a fine upon a collective bargaining representative
for contract interpretation unfavorable to the union.1
In light
of section 8 (b) (1) (B) 's policy of protecting an employer's bargaining rights from union interference, these early decisions
raised a number of difficult questions: Was the statute being
unnecessarily restricted in scope at the expense of the employer?
Could application of section 8(b) (1) (B) be extended without
perverting its legislative intent? Would an extension of it be
8.

1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT

oF 1947, S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 427 (1947)

added).

(emphasis

This unfair labor practice referred to is not perhaps of tremendous importance, but employees cannot say to their employer, 'We
do not like Mr. X, we will not meet Mr. X. You have to send us
Mr. Y.'
93 CONG. REC. 3837 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
9. Note 11 infra.
10. Comment, Union Discipline of Supervisor Members, 74 COLUM.

L. REV. 706 (1974); Comment, The Role of Supervisors in Employee
Unions, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 185 (1972).
11. District Council of Painters No. 48, 152 N.L.R.B. 1136 (1965);
Warehousemen, Local 986, 145 N.L.R.B. 1511 (1964); Los Angeles Cloak
Joint Bd. ILGWU, 127 N.L.R.B. 1543 (1960); Teamsters Local 324, 127
N.L.R.B. 488 (1960); Pipe Trades Dist. Council No. 16, 120 N.L.R.B.
249 (1958). These cases held that the union committed an 8(b) (1) (B)
violation when it attempted to obtain the discharge of an employer representative or refused to deal with such representative. See NLRB v.
Puerto Rico Rayon Mills, Inc., 293 F.2d 941 (1st Cir. 1961) (no union
violation of 8(b) (1) (B) when the union refused to deal with a supervisor who was not also a collective bargaining or grievance adjustment
representative).
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unduly harsh' and burdensome to the union in light of the
interest which the union had to protect? In 1968 these problems were resolved by the Board, largely in favor of employers,
in San Francisco-OaklandMailers' Union No. 18.12
Extension of Section 8 (b) (1) (B) from its OriginalConfines
In Oakland Mailers' a union supervisor was fined for allocating work to a nonunion employee. In finding a violation of
8(b)(1) (B), the Board relied on the belief that the supervisor's
decision of whether to permit a non-union -member to perform
the work or not, required an interpretation, by the supervisor, of
the collective bargaining contract between the union and the
employer. To the extent that the fined supervisor was engaged
in contract interpretations he was acting as a collective bargaining representative for his employer. As a result of the fine, the
employer's representative for purposes of collective bargaining
or grievance adjustment had been restrained, thereby producing
a concurrent restraint upon the employer. 13 Since the union's
acts were directed primarily at the collective bargaining representative, the employer was only indirectly restrained, and the
union fine of the supervisor had no effect upon the employer in
the selection of his collective bargaining or grievance adjustment
representatives.14

The Oakland Mailers' decision is significant since the Board
found an 8(b)(1)(B) violation in a situation involving substitution of the union's attitude for that of the employer's, whereas
in earlier decisions the Board had required an actual substitution
of personnel rather than a mere change in attitude. 15 In Oakland Mailers' the union fined the supervisor for the manner in
which he performed his duties as a collective bargainer and

thereby attempted to substitute its attitude for the employer's
attitude. Conversely, had the union refused to meet or deal
with the particular collective bargaining representative, such
refusal would have constituted an attempt to substitute union
personnel for the employer's personnel.
Thus, section
8(b)(1)(B) was extended from its original confines of only
protecting employers in the selection of their collective bargaining representatives to the protection of the manner in which an
employer's collective bargaining representative performs his
duties.16
12. 172 N.L.R.B. 2173 (1968).

13. Id.
14. The Board determined that such action by the union was
... designed to change the Charging Party's [employer's] representatives from persons representing the viewpoint of management to persons
responsive or subservient to Respondent's [the union's] will." Id. at

2173.

15. See cases cited in note 11 supra.
16. See 52 J. URBAN LAw 789 (1975).
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Although such an extension of 8(b) (1) (B) substantially
increased the protection of an employer's collective bargaining
rights, it raised further unresolved issues. After Oakland Mailers' the language of 8 (b) (1) (B) had to be examined more closely
than had been done earlier. It was also necessary to determine
whether the language of 8(b) (1) (B) could be extended even further to protect the employer's interests without encroaching upon
fundamental union rights.
Collective Bargainingand Grievance Adjustment
Since Oakland Mailers' held that a union committed a section 8(b) (1) (B) violation even though an employer was not
directly restrained in the selection of his collective bargaining or
grievance adjustment representative, the best means to further
extend section 8 (b) (1) (B)'s protection of the employer would
be to loosen the restrictions on who may qualify as a collective
bargaining or grievance adjustment representative. In the past,
it has been held that collective bargaining involves negotiation of
rates of pay, wages or hours of employment. 17 Therefore, a
representative of an employer who engages in such negotiations
for the employer can be considered a collective bargaining representative."' Grievance adjustment, on the other hand, involves
resolution of day to day problems and complaints of the employees."' In determining whether an employer representative has
collective bargaining or grievance adjustment powers it is helpful
to look for substantial authority as such a representative in the
past. '- ' If the employer representative has exercised collective
17. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970):
(d) For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is
the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or
any question arising thereunder ....
18. W.W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949).
19. Painters Local 1010 v. NLRB, 293 F.2d 133, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1963). That case held that "'[O]ther terms
and conditions of employment,' [from 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970)] refers
to and includes only those provisions, in addition to wages and hours,
which have to do with actual performance of work or to subsequent relations." Id. at 135. Pressman's Union 13, 192 N.L.R.B. 106 (1971) indicated that the duties of a grievance adjuster would consist of:
[A]uthoriz[ation] to handle the problems which may arise in the
assistant foreman's area during the shift; this includes complaints
or grievances of the employees as well as problems which concern
the equipment.
Id. at 107; see also San Francisco Typographical Union 21, 193 N.L.R.B.
319 (1971) (power to make recommendations for the resolution of griev-

ances); Detroit Pressmen's Union 13, 192 N.L.R.B. 106 (1971)

(authority

to independently adjust all employee grievances arising during the shift
and resolvable on the spot). Teamsters Local 287, 183 N.L.R.B. 398
(1970).
20. NLRB v. Toledo Locals Nos. 15-P & 272, Lithographers, 437 F.2d
55 (6th Cir. 1971).
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bargaining or grievance adjustment powers in the past then it is
not necessary that those powers be provided for in the collective
21
bargaining agreement.
In order to find a union in violation of 8(b)(1)(B) for
imposing a fine upon an employer's representatives, most cases,
including Oakland Mailers', had required that the employer's
representatives be designated as collective bargaining or grievance adjustment representatives or that they had exercised the
22
powers of such a representative at the time of the union fine.
In Dallas Mailers Union, Local 143 v. NLRB 23 and in NLRB v.
Toledo Locals Nos. 15-P & 272, Lithographers,24 however, section 8(b) (1) (B) protection was extended to an employer's supervisors who were fined by the union for having exercised
their supervisory rather than their collective bargaining or grievance adjustment representative duties. In both Dallas Mailers
Union and Toledo Locals, the courts indicated that union restraint upon a supervisor-member need only be potential, not
actual. In those instances where a union fines a collective
bargaining or grievance adjustment representative for his method of exercising his collective bargaining or grievance adjustment representative functions there would be an actual restraint. 25 However, where the union fines a supervisor-member
for his method of exercising his supervisory and not his collective bargaining or grievance adjustment functions and the supervisor has the authority to act as a collective bargainer or grievance adjuster there has been a potential restraint if it can
reasonably be concluded that the supervisor's future performance of his grievance adjustment or collective bargaining functions on behalf of the employer will be impaired by the union's
discipline. 26 Furthermore, finding a union in violation of section 8(b) (1) (B) in these circumstances, would be justified
even if the supervisor did not have authority to adjust grievances
or collectively bargain because the employer may select the
disciplined supervisor to be a collective bargaining or grievance
21. Erie Newspaper Guild, Local 187 v. NLRB, 489 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.
1973); Meat Cutters Union Local 81 v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir.

1972).
22. NLRB v. Puerto Rico Rayon Mills, Inc., 293 F.2d 941 (1st Cir.
1961) (no 8(b) (1) (B) violation was found since the supervisors were
not collective bargaining representatives).
23. 445 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
24. 437 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971).
25. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
26. This principle was first enunciated in NLRB v. Toledo Locals Nos.
15-P & 272, Lithographers, 437 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971). In Toledo Locals, the union was held to be in violation of 8(b) (1) (B) for having
fined supervisor-members who were engaged in strikebreaking and performing rank-and-file struck work. The decision was followed in Dallas
Mailers Union, Local 143 v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1971) and
Asbestos Workers, Local 127, 189 N.L.R.B. 854 (1971).
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adjustment representative at some future date.27 This latter
practice is known as the "reservoir doctrine." Under this doctrine, it is assumed that the employer has a right to demand
loyalty of his representatives, whether they are supervisors or
collective bargaining or grievance adjustment representatives.
Without such loyalty the union would enjoy an unfair advantage
in bargaining power over the employer. Employers would have
difficulty finding someone to be a supervisor or collective bargaining or grievance adjustment representative since potential
candidates for the job would be reluctant to assume responsibility if they were aware of the fact that they might be subjected to
fines and penalties for performing their duties. The employer,
therefore, needs a reserve of loyal supervisors upon whom he can
rely to serve as collective bargaining or grievance adjustment
representatives. 28 In this manner, the requirements as to what
type of employer representatives would be protected as collective
bargainingor grievance adjustment representatives under section
8(b) (1) (B) was relaxed. 29 To be held in violation of section
8(b) (1) (B) a union need only fine a supervisor for his performance of supervisory duties.30 Although the cases do not go
so far as to hold that the imposition of a union fine upon a
supervisor-member is unlawful per se, 31 they do make it clear
that a union will face a heavy burden of justification for imposing a fine upon a supervisor.
It is submitted that this reasoning will thoroughly protect
the employer's need to have unrestrained representatives. Such
a far reaching effect, however, can seriously undermine a union's
27. The underlying justification for this principle, as enunciated in
Toledo Locals, was that a supervisor, while engaged in the performance

of rank-and-file struck work, is performing a supervisory function in or-

der to carry out the policies of management.

NLRB v. Toledo Locals

Nos. 15-P & 272, Lithographers, 437 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1971).

28. Id. This line of reasoning was extended to the area of contract
interpretation in Meat Cutters Union Local 81 v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 794
(D.C. Cir. 1972). Meat Cutters stressed the plight of the supervisor, who
is placed in a tense situation, since if he follows his employer's orders
he can be fined or expelled from the union, and if he does not follow
his employer's orders he can be fired.

29. Erie Newspaper Guild, Local 187 v. NLRB, 489 F..2d 416 (3d Cir.
1973); Meat Cutters Union Local 81 v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Dallas Mailers Union, Local 143 v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir.
1971); NLRB v. Toledo Locals Nos. 15-P & 272, Lithographers, 437 F.2d
55 (6th Cir. 1971); Asbestos Workers, Local 127, 189 N.L.R.B. 854 (1971).
These cases held that union punishment imposed for any acts performed

in the course of a supervisor's supervisory and managerial duties is an
8(b) (1) (B) violation, whether or not the supervisor was acting as a collective bargaining representative, or even if he had not done so in the

past. See 51 TEXAS L. REV. 595 (1973).
30. Bakery Workers, Locals 24 & 119, 216 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 88
L.R.R.M. 1390 (1975); New York Typographical Union 6, 216 N.L.R.B.
No. 147, 88 L.R.R.M. 1384 (1975).

31. It is undisputed that union fines for failure to attend union meetings or pay union dues will not result in 8(b) (1) (B) violations. Dallas
Mailers Union, Local 143 v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 730 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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ability to maintain discipline within its ranks and protect its own
interests. 2 In support of this proposition it is significant that
the statutory language only protects against restraint of collective
bargaining and grievance adjustment representatives. If Congress had intended to protect against restraint of supervisors, as
well as collective bargaining or grievance adjustment representatives, perhaps 8(b) (1) (B) would have been worded differently
to include supervisors.
These criticisms have not -gone unheeded, and recent decisions indicate that the employer-supervisor loyalty argument
may no longer be a sufficient basis upon which an employer may
successfully press his claim of an 8(b) (1) (B) violation. Formerly, the loyalty arguments, where found to have some basis in
fact, would override union defenses to a charge of an
8(b) (1) (B) violation.3 3 Furthermore, in cases involving union fines upon supervisor-members for strikebreaking, the trend
had been to find the union in violation of section 8 (b) (1) (B).
This was true whether the fined members were collective bargaining representatives or only supervisors.3 4 In Florida Power
& Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 35 however, this trend was
reversed, and the loyalty argument is now subject to close scrutiny and increased attack.
The FloridaPower Decision
In the Florida Power case, the Supreme Court consolidated
two Board decisions for trial: IBEW System Council U-43 6 and
IBEW, Local 134.37 In both cases the respective employers
were engaged in an economic strike with the same union. Some
of the supervisors were members of' the union, others were not,
and still others only held withdrawal cards, giving them the right
to retain certain accrued union benefits. In both cases the
employers requested the supervisors to cross the picket lines and
perform the rank-and-file work normally done by the striking
employees. Those supervisors who were union members or who
retained union benefits and who crossed the picket lines were
fined by the union. The employers and some of the supervisors
in both cases brought 8(b) (1) (B) charges against the union. In
response to these charges the United States Supreme Court held
that union fines imposed upon supervisor-members who crossed
32. See note 29 supra.

33. Id.
34. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
35. 417 U.S. 790 (1974).
36. The Board decision is reported at 193 N.L.R.B. 30 (1971).

37. The Board decision is reported at 192 N.L.R.B. 85 (1971).
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picket lines and performed struck work did not constitute an
8(b) (1) (B) violation.38
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court reasoned that
supervisors who performed rank-and-file struck work were not
performing supervisory or management duties, and thus the
employer had not in any way been restrained in the selection or
retention of supervisors or collective bargaining representatives. 39 Although the Court recognized the existence of the
employer-supervisor loyalty argument, it pointed out that the
employer, by agreeing to a union security clause agreement
including supervisors, had effectively given up his right to hire
and retain only non-union supervisors. The employer, therefore, could not complain that he had been denied the loyalty of
40
his supervisors.
The Employer's Right to Demand Loyalty of His Supervisors
The determination of whether an employer has the right to
demand the loyalty of his supervisors requires interpretation of
two important sections of the Act. Under section 2(3) 41 supervisors are excluded from the definition of employees. Basically,
this means that supervisors are not guaranteed the same rights as
employees to form, join or assist in the organization of labor
organizations. 42 Furthermore, under section 14(a) 43 supervisors are not prohibited from joining or remaining members of
labor organizations, but an employer is not required to consider
a supervisor as an employee for the purposes of collective bargaining. When considered together, these sections clearly indicate that an employer need not hire or retain union members as
38. Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790, 813
(1974).
39. The Court held, inter alia:

The conclusion is thus inescapable that a union's discipline of one of

its members who is a supervisory employee can constitute a violation
of 8(b) (1) (B) only when that discipline may adversely affect the
supervisor's conduct in performing the duties of, and acting in his

capacity as, grievance adjuster or collective bargainer on behalf of
the employer.
Id. at 804-05.

40. Id. at 808-12. Operating Eng'rs, Local 501, 217 N.L.R.B. No.
21, 89 L.R.R.M. 1012 (1975).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970) indicates that "The term 'employee'
...shall not include ... any individual employed as a supervisor.
Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc., 416 U.S. 653 (1974).
42. Carpenters Dist. Council, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 564

(D.C. Cir. 1959); Rodriguez v. Conagra, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 951 (D. P.R.
1974).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1970):

(a) Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a
zation, but no employer subject to this subchapter shall be compelled
to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for
the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining.
supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organi-
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supervisors. 4 4 Ultimately, such a reading of sections 2(3) and
14(a) weakens the theory that a union fine levied upon supervisors constitutes an 8(b) (1) (B) violation in order to protect the
loyalty of an employer's supervisors. 45 Since the employer is not
required to hire or retain union members as supervisors, if he
does decide to hire or retain supervisors who are union members, his act is voluntary. If the union fines one of these supervisors, the employer cannot argue that he has been coerced
4
or restrained in the selection of a representative. 6
Although such a restriction upon those whom an employer
may select as supervisors, e.g., nonunion supervisors in order to
insure loyalty, might excessively burden the employer, the problem can ultimately be solved by making the supervisor's position
so economically attractive that prospective supervisors will readily forfeit their union benefits, thereby ensuring full loyalty to the
employer.' 7 Relying heavily upon this rationale, the Court in
Florida Power pointed out that the union's right to strike outweighed the employer's right to the loyalty of his supervisors.45
Additionally, the Court made it clear that it was halting the
previous expansion of 8(b) (1) (B) and that it was shifting the
balance to the side of the union. In short, the Court established
Oakland Mailers' as the outer limit of section 8(b) (1) (B) inter49
pretation and abolished the "reservoir doctrine.
44. Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790
(1974); Texas Co. v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1952); Rodriguez v.
Conagra, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 951 (D. P.R. 1974); Comment, The Role of
Supervisors in Employee Unions, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 185 (1972).
45. International Typographical, Local 38 v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 6 (1st
Cir. 1960); Portland Stereotypers' & Electrotypers', Local 48, 137 N.L.R.B.
782, 787 (1962).
46. The end product of this line of reasoning is that an employer
who gives in to union demands and agrees to include supervisors in the
collective bargaining agreement gives up the right to use those supervisors as strikebreakers in the performance of rank-and-file work.
Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790 (1974). See
also the dissenting opinion of Member Fanning in Carpenters, AFL-CIO,
218 N.L.R.B. No. 157, 89 L.R.R.M. 1477 (1975) and New York Typographical, Union 6, 216 N.L.R.B. No. 147, 88 L.R.R.M. 1384 (1975).
47. Gould, Some Limitations Upon Union Discipline Under the National Labor Relations Act: The Radiations of Allis-Chalmers, 1970
DUKE L.J. 1067.
In support of the proposition that a supervisor may
forego union membership under a closed shop arrangement since he need
only pay dues but need not belong to the union, see NLRB v. General
Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 743-44 (1963) (dictum); Silard, Labor Board
Regulation of Union Discipline After Allis-Chalmers, Marine Workers
and Scofield, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 187 (1969).
48. Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790
(1974).
49. Id. at 805. Ultimately, the Court's judgment rested on a finding
that supervisors performing rank-and-file struck work were not performing supervisory or collective bargaining functions. This finding was not
unanimous. Id. at 813-16 (dissenting opinion). See also IBEW v.
NLRB, 487 F.2d 1143, 1173-82 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion), aff'd
sub nom. Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790
(1974).
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The Court in Florida Power concluded that a union fine
upon a supervisor-member would constitute an 8(b)(1)(B)
violation only where the supervisor was engaged in collective
bargaining or grievance adjustment duties.50 The Court also
impliedly indicated that a union fine upon a supervisor-member
who was performing supervisory duties would not constitute an
8(b)(1)(B) violation if the supervisory duties did not include
This
collective bargaining or grievance adjustment duties.5
discussion, however, was dicta. Since the Court had concluded
that strikebreaking supervisors were not involved in collective
bargaining or grievance adjustment, or even supervisory duties
while they were engaged in such strikebreaking,5 2 the actual
holding of the case was limited to a finding of no union violation
of 8(b) (1) (B) for a union fine imposed upon a supervisor53
member who is performing non-supervisory struck work.
Therefore, previous Board and court decisions finding a union
in violation of section 8(b) (1) (B) for a fine imposed upon a
supervisor-member who has the authority of a collective bargainer or grievance adjuster and is engaged in supervisory work
are still viable.54 The Court's decision in Florida Power effectively did no more than convert supervisor strikebreaking into a
non-supervisory activity, punishable by a union fine.
Although the Court in Florida Power attempted to clarify
the issues in what has become an increasingly complex area, and
although it also attempted to provide a resolution to those issues
in order to help guide the lower courts and the Board in their
decisions, the case has not met with complete Board satisfaction.
In an attempt to limit Florida Power as much as possible, the
Board has begun to closely scrutinize the nature of the duties the
supervisor performs while strikebreaking. In those cases where
supervisors have engaged in only minimal rank-and-file work
during a strike, and have performed substantially the same
duties as they had been responsible for prior to the strike, a
union fine upon supervisors for strikebreaking will be held to be
an 8(b) (1) (B) violation if the supervisor has the authority of a
collective bargainer or grievance adjuster. 5 In this manner, the
50. The Court took pains to point out that:

Nowhere in the legislative history is there to be found any implication that Congress sought to extend protection to the employer

from union restraint or coercion when engaged in any activity other

than the selection of its representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining and grievance adjustment.
Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. at 804.
51. Id. at 805.
52. Id. at 803.
53. Id. at 805 (emphasis added).

54. See cases cited at note 29 supra.
55. Warehouse Local 6, 220 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 90 L.R.R.M. 1363 (1975);
Carpenters, AFL-CIO, 218 N.L.R.B. No. 157, 89 L.R.R.M. 1477 (1975); Car-
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Board has interpreted FloridaPower to mean that where a union
imposes a fine upon a supervisor-member who has performed
largely supervisory work during a strike, there will be an
8(b) (1) (B) violation because it is likely that an adverse effect
will carry over to the supervisor's performance of his collective
bargaining or grievance adjustment duties.58
The Board, through its reluctance to enforce the standards
set out in Florida Power, has frustrated the efforts of the Supreme Court to provide a workable rule and to clarify the issues
involved in 8(b) (1) (B) intepretation. Recent Board decisions
have now made it necessary to determine what constitutes minimal rank-and-file work and what percentage of that work must
be performed in order to permit the union to fine strikebreaking
supervisor-members. 57
Although the holding and subsequent
Board intepretation of Florida Power have been limited to supervisor strikebreaking, the decision has also had an impact on
other 8 (b) (1) (B) situations.5 8
Broad Interpretationof FloridaPower & Light by FederalCourts
If recent decisions can be interpreted as a trend, then the
trend has been towards a further restriction of section
8(b) (1) (B) in order to swing the balance in favor of the union.
An example of this restriction arises in the area of a supervisor
who is fined for exercising merely supervisory powers. Although the Court in Florida Power discussed the problem, it was
not directly at issue in that case, and thus the discussion was
merely dicta. The problem was at issue, however, in NLRB v.
Rochester Musicians Association, Local 66.59
In Rochester Musicians, the conductor of the Rochester
Philharmonic was classified as a supervisor. Through his recpenters, Local 14, 217 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 89 L.R.R.M. 1002 (1975); Bakery
Workers, Locals 24 & 119, 216 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 88 L.R.R.M. 1390 (1975);
Chicago Typographical, Union 16, 216 N.L.R.B. No. 149, 88 L.R.R.M. 1378
(1975); New York Typographical, Union 6, 216 N.L.R.B. No. 147, 88
L.R.R.M. 1384 (1975).
56. Note 55 supra.
57. Longshoremen, Local 6, 220 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 90 L.R.R.M. 1363
(1975) held that a fine upon a strikebreaking supervisor who performed
40-50 percent rank-and-file struck work constituted an 8(b) (1) (B) violation. The case also showed an intent to limit Florida Power as much
as possible.
58. In Local 702, IBEW, 219 N.L.R.B. No. 48, 89 L.R.R.M. 1718 (1975)
a supervisor was fined by the union after setting up headquarters in
a town allegedly unapproved by the collective bargaining agreement.
The majority found no 8(b) (1) (B) violation on the ground that when
the supervisor did not move the headquarters as instructed by his immediate supervisor, he was not acting as a collective bargaining representative. Therefore, 8(b) (1) (B) afforded him no protection. Assuming that
the supervisor was fined for contract interpretation in his original selection of the site (that was essentially a factual dispute) the decision is
clearly contra to Meat Cutters Union Local 81 v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 794
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
59. 514 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1975).

1976]

Union Discipline of Supervisors

ommendation five musicians were fired for incompetence. The
Musicians Association, of which the conductor was a member,
subsequently fined the conductor for his unfavorable recommendation. The second circuit found no 8(b)(1)(B) violation
where it was shown, at the time of the fine, that the conductor
did not possess any formal grievance adjustment powers and that
he was only engaged in a supervisory and not a collective
bargaining or grievance adjustment function. The court indicated that to find a section 8(b) (1) (B) violation there must be
evidence that the supervisor presently plays a part in grievance
adjustment or collective bargaining.60
In short, the second
circuit, in accordance with Florida Power, refused to apply the
"reservoir doctrine" to a non-struck work context.
Rochester Musicians, therefore, returns 8(b) (1) (B) construction to the Oakland Mailers' interpretation, i.e., to constitute
an 8(b) (1) (B) violation a union must fine an employer representative for the exercise of his supervisory duties if he has the
authority of a collective bargainer or grievance adjuster, or for
the exercise of his collective bargaining or grievance adjustment
functions, but not merely for the performance of his supervisory
duties if he has no collective bargaining or grievance adjustment
authority.6 1 However, if the Board elects to distinguish and
circumvent Rochester Musicians, as it did Florida Power, the
result could be formulation of further tests and guidelines resulting in an even more tangled web of issues and problems in
8(b)(1) (B) interpretation. This would leave such interpretation in as complicated a state as it was before the Court attempted to clarify and untangle it in Florida Power. Unfortunately,
these divergent interpretations of 8(b)(1)(B) by the federal
courts and the Board leave the statute in such a confusing state
that it certainly will not provide the stability in employer-union
relations which is so necessary to promote the peaceful settle2
ment of labor relations disputes.
A recent case has interpreted 8(b)(1)(B) in such a manner as to promote even more instability. In Wisconsin River
Valley District Council v. NLRB,6 3 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals was faced with a situation involving a strikebreaking
60. Id. at 992.
61. The court's holding in Rochester Musicians would therefore reverse the trend established by Meat Cutters Union Local 81 v. NLRB,
458 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1972), where a supervisor was fined for exercising
supervisory powers. This trend was not halted by Florida Power since
that case was limited to supervisors performing rank-and-file struck

work.

Florida Power did, however, halt the precedent established in

NLRB v. Toledo Locals Nos. 15-P & 272, Lithographers, 437 F.2d 55

(6th Cir. 1971).
62. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
63. 532 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1976).
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supervisor-member who performed primarily supervisory work
while he was engaged in strikebreaking.
The court interpreted Florida Power to mean that a union
fine imposed upon a strikebreaking supervisor-member when he
performs supervisory work during a strike will constitute an
8(b) (1) (B) violation where the supervisor has the authority to
adjust grievances. 64 In this manner, the Board's narrow interpretation of FloridaPower was sanctioned 5
In Wisconsin River the seventh circuit impliedly indicated
that a supervisor who has the authority of a collective bargaining
or grievance adjustment representative would be affected in his
capacity as a collective bargainer or grievance adjuster even
though he was not performing collective bargaining or grievance
adjustment at the time of the fine. 66 In so holding, the court
relied upon the following language from FloridaPower:
[A] union's discipline of one of its members who is a supervisory employee can constitute a violation of § 8(b) (1) (B)
only when that discipline may adversely affect the supervisor's
conduct in performing the duties of, and acting in his capacity
as, grievance adjuster or collective bargainer on behalf of the
employer.

We may assume that the Board's Oakland Mailers decision fell within the outer limits of that test, . . . .67
That language would seem to support the theory of the court in
Wisconsin River which maintained that an employer's representative need only be affected in his performance of collective
bargaining or grievance adjustment duties, and that he need not
have been performing such duties at the time of the fine. However, in Wisconsin River, the seventh circuit failed to realize that
Florida Power did not find an 8(b) (1) (B) violation because
the supervisors in that case
were not engaged in collective bargaining or grievance adjustment, or in any activities related thereto, when they crossed
union picket lines during
an economic strike to engage in rank8
and-file struck work.

That language would seem to indicate that a supervisor must be
exercising collective bargaining or grievance adjustment duties
at the time of the fine and that only affecting a supervisor's
performance of those duties (as shown by his possession of the
authority of a collective bargainer or grievance adjuster) where
64. Id. at 52.
65. See notes 55 & 57 supra and accompanying text.

66. Wisconsin River Valley Dist. Council v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 47,
52 (7th Cir. 1976).
67. Id. at 52 citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641.
417 U.S. 790, 804-05 (emphasis added).

68. 417 U.S. at 805 (1974).
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he is not in fact exercising them would be insufficient to constitute an 8(b) (1) (B) violation.""
On the whole, these artificial distinctions between a supervisor doing supervisory work, a supervisor doing collective bargaining or grievance adjustment work, and a supervisor doing
rank-and-file struck work seem largely fictitious. In reality, it is
only a tool for extending 8(b) (1) (B) beyond its original statutory limits, in order to protect the employer, without completely
subverting the purpose of the section. Perhaps a satisfactory
solution to this instability in 8(b) (1) (B) interpretation would
be for Congress, the courts and the Board to utilize alternative
means of resolving 8 (b) (1) (B) disputes.
CONCLUSION

Alternative methods for settlement of 8 (b) (1) (B) disputes
could take many forms. One possibility would be for Congress to amend section 8(b) (1) (B) to reflect those parts of
recent decisions which would be most helpful in defining the
nature and function of the section. Specifically, such words as
"restrain or coerce" and "collective bargaining or grievance
adjustment representatives" could be further defined so as to
70
establish definite guidelines for union and employer conduct.
some or all types of
alternative,
another
Under
8(b) (1) (B) disputes could be left to arbitration proceedings.
Where an issue presented in an unfair labor practice case has
previously been decided in arbitration proceedings the Board
will defer the dispute to arbitration if the proceedings are fair
and regular, and all parties agree to be bound.7 ' If, for example, the collective bargaining agreement prohibits the fining or
disciplining of a supervisor by the union, disputes could be left
to arbitration since what is really involved is the extent of a
supervisor's authority. These types of contract (collective bargaining agreement) interpretations could best be performed by
the parties in the course of their grievance procedure, or if
necessary, by arbitration. In fact, recent decisions indicate a
tendency by the Board to leave 8 (b) (1) (B) disputes to arbitration in those cases in which the collective bargaining agreement
so provides.7 2 Board or court settlement of the dispute could be
69. Id. at 803-05.

70. It would certainly be helpful if 8(b) (1) (B) were amended to

provide a clear course of acceptable conduct and workable guidelines
for unions and employers in light of such decisions as Florida Power

& Light Co. v. IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790 (1974); NLRB v. Rochester
Musicians Ass'n, Local 66, 514 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1975); Longshoremen,
Local 6, 220 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 90 L.R.R.M. 1363 (1975).
71. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971); Spielberg Mfg.
Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
72. Columbia Typographical, Union 101, 207 N.L.R.B. 841 (1973); Bal-
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reserved for those situations where arbitration has been totally
7 3
ineffective.
As a further alternative to present 8(b) (1) (B) enforcement, the parties could be encouraged to maintain greater explicitness of provisions for the settlement of 8(b) (1) (B) disputes
in the terms of their collective bargaining agreements. This
would prevent either party from attempting to gain through a
union fine or contract interpretation what they could not gain at
the bargaining table.7 4 The Board and the courts could then
alleviate 8(b)(1)(B) interpretation problems by formulating
more workable, uniform guidelines for examining the disputed
conduct of the fined supervisor-member. Thorough evidentiary
findings could be made to determine if the supervisor-member
possesses or has in the past possessed collective bargaining or
grievance adjustment powers. If he does possess or has possessed such powers, a union fine upon a supervisor would be an
8(b) (1) (B) violation, regardless of whether or not the supervisor has exercised, or is in fact exercising, such collective bargaining or grievance adjustment powers. However, where the supervisor does not or has never possessed grievance adjustment or
collective bargaining functions there would be no union violation of 8(b) (1) (B) on the grounds that the supervisor may be
selected as a collective bargaining or grievance adjustment representative in the future. Application of such a standard would
thereby avoid the problems of the "reservoir doctrine" and its
inherent vagueness. At the same time, the employer would be
protected from restraint or coercion of his collective bargainers or grievance adjusters without restricting application of
8(b) (1) (B) to its original narrow confines. After all, the true
purpose of 8(b) (1) (B) is to protect the employer, not the individual supervisor.
Whatever the form of action taken to correct the present
state of 8(b) (1) (B) interepretation, such action is needed soon.
All parties involved need rules and standards with which to
guide their conduct in order to efficiently protect those interests
which each party considers so important.

Robert L. Abraham
timore Typographical, Union 12, 201 N.L.R.B. 120 (1973); Houston Mailers, Union 36, 199 N.L.R.B. 804 (1972). In these cases, the collective
bargaining agreements provided for arbitration in case of a fine upon
a supervisor. The Board dismissed the charges in order to permit the
Varties to engage in arbitration. This procedure was recommended in
eat Cutters Union Local 81 v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
73. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
74. Comment, The Role of Supervisors in Employee Unions, 40 U.
CHi. L. REV. 185, 189 (1972). Such conduct on the part of a union could

also constitute an 8 (b) (3) violation (refusal to bargain collectively with
an employer).

